I had a G3 Starter Kit on the desk: one UA-G3 Door Hub Mini, one UA-G3 Wall reader. The plan was to run the UniFi Access controller in Docker on the office Synology NAS, keep everything on the local LAN, and let the door hardware adopt there.

Ubiquiti officially does not support this. They sell consoles with Access pre-installed and tell you to run it there. The dciancu/unifi-protect-unvr-docker-arm64 repository proves the application layer can be lifted off a console image; nobody has done it for Access, and the device adoption story is materially different from Protect.

That was the constraint I started from: a docker controller, a door hub that had to adopt through L2 discovery, and a NAS that looked like the right host until the architecture requirement broke it. AWS only entered the story after the local Synology path failed.

The examples below use real values from the deployment, sanitized only where they would not help a reader reproduce the design.

What "Adoption" Actually Means for Access

UniFi Access bootstrapping starts with local discovery: devices broadcast on UDP 10001, and in this unsupported container setup the Hub Mini only offered itself to a controller that answered from the same L2 broadcast domain. Ubiquiti's own port list calls 10001/udp the Access device discovery path (docs).

That sounds the same as Network adoption, but it is not. UniFi Network firmware honors DHCP option 43 as a fallback (a controller IP encoded as 01 04 <ip-bytes>), and the devices have a set-inform CLI over SSH. Access devices have neither. A community-confirmed thread documents this directly:

"Access needs to see the other device in the same VLAN (broadcast domain)."

I tested option 43 anyway. The MikroTik sent it, the lease included the encoded controller IP, the Hub Mini ignored it. No set-inform, no SSH, no fallback. The device only adopted once the controller could participate in the L2 discovery exchange. After adoption, normal controller-to-device traffic can be L3-routed; the first discovery step was the hard constraint.

That single fact controls every networking decision in this story.

sequenceDiagram
    participant Device as G3 Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230
    participant LAN as Office LAN<br/>broadcast domain
    participant Controller as UniFi Access<br/>Controller

    Note over Device,Controller: Boots fresh from box

    Device->>LAN: UDP broadcast<br/>10.255.255.255:10001<br/>"I am MAC 84:78:48:..."
    LAN-->>Controller: ✓ delivered (same L2)
    Controller->>Device: UDP unicast<br/>:10001 "I am your controller"
    Device->>Controller: TCP 12443 + MQTT 12812<br/>establish session

    Note over Device,Controller: Adoption complete

    rect rgb(255, 230, 230)
        Note over Device,LAN: ❌ Broadcast does NOT cross<br/>L3 routers / IPSec tunnels
        Note over Device,LAN: ❌ No DHCP option 43 fallback<br/>(unlike UniFi Network)
        Note over Device,LAN: ❌ No SSH / set-inform CLI
    end

Wrong Assumption 1: Run It on the Synology

The first idea was the obvious one. We had a DSM 7.2.2 box on the office LAN, with Portainer, Traefik, the existing service mesh, and plenty of CPU. Why deploy anywhere else?

Ubiquiti only publishes Access for arm64. Synology is x86_64. The expected workaround was QEMU user-mode emulation through binfmt_misc:

docker run --privileged --rm tonistiigi/binfmt --install arm64
docker run --platform=linux/arm64 alpine uname -m
# expected: aarch64

The first command failed:

installing: arm64 cannot register "/usr/bin/qemu-aarch64" to
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register: write /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register:
invalid argument

supported:
  - linux/amd64
  - linux/amd64/v2
  - linux/amd64/v3
  - linux/386

Probing the kernel directly showed why:

docker run --rm --privileged --platform=linux/amd64 alpine \
  sh -c 'ls -la /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/; cat /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/status'

# dr-xr-xr-x    2 root     root             0 May 23 19:36 .
# (no 'register' or 'status' files)
# cat: can't open '/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/status': No such file or directory

The binfmt_misc filesystem is mounted, but it is read-only and the register/status interface is gone. Synology's kernel (4.4.302+) is built with binfmt_misc deliberately locked down. No userspace can register a new format, with or without privileges, with or without IAM equivalents.

VMM was the next instinct: run a Linux ARM VM on the Synology. VMM uses KVM, which can only virtualize the host architecture. Without nested full-system QEMU (which DSM VMM does not expose), an arm64 VM on Intel Synology is not an option.

The Synology had to come out of the picture as the controller host.

Wrong Assumption 2: AWS arm64 + IPSec L3 + DHCP Option 43

The next plan was cleaner architecturally. We have AWS, we have arm64 instances (t4g.medium), and we have a Mikrotik RB5009 with a static public IP that already terminates one IPSec tunnel.

The design looked like this:

flowchart LR
    subgraph Office["Office LAN 10.255.255.0/24"]
        Hub[Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230]
        Reader[G3 Reader<br/>10.255.255.229]
        Mikrotik[Mikrotik RB5009<br/>10.255.255.1]
    end

    subgraph AWS["AWS eu-north-1"]
        Controller[unifi-access<br/>EC2 t4g.medium<br/>172.31.26.37]
    end

    Hub --> Mikrotik
    Reader --> Mikrotik
    Mikrotik -- "IPSec IKEv2<br/>10.255.255.0/24 ↔ 172.31.26.37/32" --> Controller

sequenceDiagram
    participant Hub as Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230
    participant MT as Mikrotik<br/>10.255.255.1
    participant Tunnel as IPSec L3 Tunnel
    participant EC2 as Controller<br/>172.31.26.37

    Note over Hub: DHCP lease arrives<br/>with option 43 = 172.31.26.37

    rect rgb(255, 230, 230)
        Hub->>Hub: Ignore option 43<br/>(Access firmware does not honor it)
    end

    Hub->>MT: Broadcast UDP 10001<br/>dst: 255.255.255.255
    Note over MT: Broadcasts do not cross L3
    MT--xTunnel: ❌ Dropped at routing

    Note over Hub,EC2: Controller never learns about the Hub Mini.<br/>Tunnel works for ICMP/TCP unicast, but useless<br/>for L2 adoption broadcasts.

The IPSec tunnel came up cleanly. From Mikrotik with an explicit source address, pings reached the controller at 10ms:

SEQ HOST                                     SIZE TTL TIME       STATUS
  0 172.31.26.37                               56  64 10ms260us
  1 172.31.26.37                               56  64 10ms404us
sent=3 received=3 packet-loss=0%

I configured DHCP option 43 on the Mikrotik to hand out the controller IP to UniFi devices:

/ip dhcp-server option add name=unifi-controller code=43 value=0x0104ac1f1a25
/ip dhcp-server network set [find address=10.255.255.0/24] dhcp-option=unifi-controller

0x01 04 ac 1f 1a 25 decodes as sub-option 1, length 4, controller IP 172.31.26.37. The lease confirmed the option was offered. The Hub Mini took the lease and ignored the option.

Several controller-side captures showed the same thing: the Hub Mini was reachable, the IPSec tunnel was healthy, and no device traffic ever reached the controller. The community thread was right.

The discovery model was the architectural constraint, not a knob to tune. Either the controller had to be on the same L2 broadcast domain as the door hardware, or the broadcast domain had to be extended to where the controller was.

The Shape That Matched the Protocol

The fix had to bring the controller container into the office broadcast domain at L2, while keeping its lifecycle in AWS. The shape that worked:

1. Keep the IPSec tunnel as the underlay - it already exists, it is encrypted, and it terminates at known endpoints.
2. Build a VXLAN tunnel between Mikrotik and the EC2 host, with VXLAN packets riding inside the IPSec tunnel.
3. Bridge the VXLAN endpoint into the office LAN on the Mikrotik side, and into a Linux bridge on the EC2 side.
4. Attach the docker container to the Linux bridge through a macvlan network, giving it a real 10.255.255.x address.

flowchart TB
    subgraph Office["Office LAN 10.255.255.0/24"]
        Hub[Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230]
        Reader[G3 Reader<br/>10.255.255.229]
        Synology[Synology Traefik<br/>10.255.255.245]
        Mikrotik[Mikrotik bridge<br/>10.255.255.1]
        VXLANmt[vxlan-aws<br/>VNI 100, UDP 4789]
        Mikrotik --- VXLANmt
    end

    subgraph Tunnel["IPSec ESP / UDP 4500"]
        ipsec[encrypted underlay]
    end

    subgraph AWS["AWS eu-north-1"]
        ens5[EC2 ens5<br/>172.31.26.37]
        vxlan0[vxlan0<br/>VNI 100, dev=ens5]
        broffice[br-office<br/>10.255.255.50]
        macvlan[docker macvlan<br/>parent=br-office]
        Container[unifi-access container<br/>eth1=10.255.255.200]
        ens5 --- vxlan0
        vxlan0 --- broffice
        broffice --- macvlan
        macvlan --- Container
    end

    VXLANmt --> ipsec
    ipsec --> ens5

    Hub -. "broadcast UDP 10001" .-> Mikrotik
    Reader -. "broadcast UDP 10001" .-> Mikrotik
    Container -. "discovery probes<br/>233.89.188.1:10001<br/>255.255.255.255:10001" .-> macvlan

The mental model that helped was this:

The controller does not need to be in AWS. It needs to be unreachable from anywhere except the office LAN, and to look to the door hardware exactly like a host on 10.255.255.0/24.

The L2 bridge made that true. AWS became invisible from the protocol's point of view.

Building the Container Image

The application layer was the dciancu Protect approach with Access surgery on top.

The base layer comes from extracting a UCG-Max firmware binary - which is publicly downloadable and binwalkable - through dpkg-repack against the unpacked rootfs:

flowchart LR
    A[fw-update.ubnt.com<br/>UCG-Max .bin] -->|wget| B[binwalk -e]
    B --> C[squashfs-root]
    C -->|dpkg-repack| D[*.deb per package]
    D --> E[base layer<br/>unifi-core, ulp-go,<br/>uos*, ubnt-tools,<br/>unifi-assets-ucgmax,<br/>node*]
    E --> F[debian:11 arm64<br/>+ apt-get install]
    F --> G[unifi-access.deb<br/>+ ms.deb<br/>+ unifi-user-assets.deb<br/>+ unifi-face-shared-lib.deb]
    G --> H[final image]

The Protect repo's pattern handles most of the heavy lifting. Access required a small number of additional patches inside the image, baked in at build time. These exist as if ! sed -i ... exit 1 guards so a future firmware version that drifts from the pattern fails the build loudly instead of silently breaking at runtime.

Patch 1: ustorage gRPC fallback

UniFi Core polls a gRPC server on 127.0.0.1:11052 for storage information. That server only exists on real UniFi consoles. Without intervention, the setup wizard fails with:

[grpc] Failed to connect to the gRPC server: 14 UNAVAILABLE:
No connection established. Last error: Error: connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:11052.
   at ServiceClientImpl.storageSettings (...)

Protect's sed flips a JS conditional so the application takes the "shell ustorage" path instead:

sed -i '/return at()?s.push/{s//return at(),!0?s.push/;h};${x;/./{x;q0};x;q1}' \
    /usr/share/unifi-core/app/service.js

The patched path calls /usr/bin/ustorage and /sbin/mdadm, which I ship as fake responses generating plausible disk/RAID JSON.

Patch 2: pre-setup nginx hostname allowlist

UniFi Core ships with a pre-setup nginx that redirects anything except unifi, localhost, or a raw IP to https://unifi:

if ($host !~* ^(unifi|localhost|[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|\[[a-f0-9:]+\])$) {
    return 302 $scheme://unifi;
}

A reverse-proxied hostname like access.example.com hits this regex and bounces. The build relaxes it so any non-empty $host passes:

sed -i 's|host !~\* \^(unifi|host !~* ^(.+|' \
    /usr/share/unifi-core/http/site-setup.conf

The file is then in /usr/share/..., which is the template directory. After a factory reset, UniFi Core copies the template into /data/unifi-core/config/http/, preserving the patch.

Patch 3: console identity

The hardware identity layer in UniFi OS is a script at /sbin/ubnt-tools. The original ubnt-tools id reports the actual board sysid. My shim writes a configurable identity based on the DEVICE env var (UNVR, UCG_MAX, UDM_PRO_MAX, etc).

The first attempt used UCG_MAX because the extracted firmware was UCG-Max. The setup wizard immediately broke with "Unexpected error during setup" because UCG-Max has hasGateway: true in its features and the wizard tried to run gateway-only steps (WAN probe, UDAPI client) that fail in a container. Switching the identity to UNVR (sysid 0xea16, no gateway features) made the wizard skip those steps. That matches what Protect users do in docker.

What the post-install block actually applies

RUN echo 'exit 0' > /usr/sbin/policy-rc.d \
    && if ! sed -i '/return at()?s.push/{s//return at(),!0?s.push/;h};${x;/./{x;q0};x;q1}' \
         /usr/share/unifi-core/app/service.js; then \
         echo 'ERROR: ustorage sed pattern not found' && exit 1; \
    fi \
    && if ! sed -i 's|host !~\* \^(unifi|host !~* ^(.+|' \
         /usr/share/unifi-core/http/site-setup.conf; then \
         echo 'ERROR: site-setup.conf hostname patch failed' && exit 1; \
    fi \
    && mv /sbin/mdadm /sbin/mdadm.orig \
    && mv /sbin/ubnt-tools /sbin/ubnt-tools.orig \
    && systemctl enable storage_disk dbpermissions fix_hosts \
         fix_apt_ubiquiti_sources init_console init_device \
    && echo -e '\n\nexport PGHOST=127.0.0.1\n' \
         >> /usr/lib/ulp-go/scripts/envs.sh

That covers it. Image is ~2.4 GB, runs as the Protect-pattern Debian-11 systemd container, with unifi-access.service, unifi-core.service, and two PostgreSQL clusters (main and access on ports 5432 and 5435).

VXLAN Underlay

The VXLAN tunnel uses UDP 4789. With both endpoints having explicit unicast addresses, the inner Ethernet frames travel inside outer UDP packets between 10.255.255.1 (Mikrotik LAN side) and 172.31.26.37 (EC2 private IP).

The existing IPSec policy is 10.255.255.0/24 ↔ 172.31.26.37/32. VXLAN outer packets between those two addresses match the policy, so they ride encrypted inside ESP. No new IPSec policy was needed; the L2 extension reuses the existing L3 tunnel as its transport.

Mikrotik side

/interface vxlan
add name=vxlan-aws vni=100 port=4789 mtu=1380 local-address=10.255.255.1

/interface vxlan vteps
add interface=vxlan-aws remote-ip=172.31.26.37

/interface bridge port
add bridge=bridge interface=vxlan-aws

/ip firewall filter
add chain=input action=accept protocol=udp dst-port=4789 \
    src-address=172.31.26.37/32 place-before=0 \
    comment="VXLAN from AWS via IPSec"

The local-address=10.255.255.1 is important. Without it, Mikrotik picks the source IP for VXLAN outer packets based on the egress interface (the WAN), and the resulting tuple does not match the IPSec policy. Forcing the LAN IP keeps everything inside the policy's transform set.

EC2 side

The first attempt looked like this:

ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 100 \
    remote 10.255.255.1 local 172.31.26.37 dstport 4789 nolearning
ip link set vxlan0 master br-office

VXLAN packets arrived from Mikrotik. Nothing went the other way. The kernel was silently dropping outbound encapsulation.

Two issues:

nolearning plus an empty FDB. With learning off and no manual entries, the kernel had no idea where to send broadcasts and unknown unicast. The fix is to add a default flood entry:

bridge fdb append 00:00:00:00:00:00 dev vxlan0 dst 10.255.255.1

No explicit dev. Without dev ens5, the kernel does a generic route lookup for the outer destination 10.255.255.1 and finds that 10.255.255.0/24 is reachable through br-office. The VXLAN outer packet routes back into the bridge, where it loops. The fix is to bind the underlay to a specific egress device:

ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 100 \
    remote 10.255.255.1 local 172.31.26.37 dstport 4789 dev ens5

With both fixes:

ip link add br-office type bridge
ip link set br-office mtu 1380 up
ip addr add 10.255.255.50/24 dev br-office

ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 100 \
    remote 10.255.255.1 local 172.31.26.37 dstport 4789 dev ens5
ip link set vxlan0 mtu 1380 master br-office up

bridge fdb append 00:00:00:00:00:00 dev vxlan0 dst 10.255.255.1

A tcpdump on ens5 after this is more honest than any documentation:

22:24:52.110815 IP 172.31.26.37.4500 > 194.126.118.207.4500:
    UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0x00607012,seq=0x80), length 120
22:24:52.252695 IP 194.126.118.207.4500 > 172.31.26.37.4500:
    UDP-encap: ESP(spi=0xc291d279,seq=0x186), length 136
22:24:52.252695 IP 10.255.255.1.50999 > 172.31.26.37.4789:
    VXLAN, flags [I] (0x08), vni 100
    STP 802.1w, Rapid STP, ...
22:24:55.861464 IP 10.255.255.1.48863 > 172.31.26.37.4789:
    VXLAN, flags [I] (0x08), vni 100
    ARP, Request who-has 10.255.255.230 tell 10.255.255.230

STP frames and the Hub Mini's gratuitous ARP both arrive over the encrypted VXLAN tunnel. The L2 extension is alive.

A useful red herring during this debugging: the IPSec tunnel uses NAT-T because the EC2 instance lives behind AWS's network address translation. So encrypted traffic shows up as udp port 4500, not raw ESP. A tcpdump filter that only matches esp returns nothing.

Persistence

VXLAN created with ip link does not survive a reboot. A small systemd unit owns the lifecycle:

# /etc/systemd/system/vxlan-office.service
[Unit]
Description=VXLAN office-bridge to Mikrotik (L2 extension over IPSec)
After=network.target strongswan-starter.service
Wants=strongswan-starter.service

[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/vxlan-office-up.sh
ExecStop=/usr/local/sbin/vxlan-office-down.sh

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

# /usr/local/sbin/vxlan-office-up.sh
#!/bin/bash
set -e
ip link show br-office >/dev/null 2>&1 || ip link add br-office type bridge
ip link set br-office mtu 1380 up
ip addr add 10.255.255.50/24 dev br-office 2>/dev/null || true

ip link del vxlan0 2>/dev/null || true
ip link add vxlan0 type vxlan id 100 \
    remote 10.255.255.1 local 172.31.26.37 dstport 4789 dev ens5
ip link set vxlan0 mtu 1380 master br-office up

bridge fdb append 00:00:00:00:00:00 dev vxlan0 dst 10.255.255.1

Wants=strongswan-starter.service ensures the IPSec tunnel comes up first. Without that ordering, the VXLAN socket is open before the underlay can carry packets, and Mikrotik silently drops the first batch.

MTU Accounting

The encapsulation chain adds bytes at three layers. Counting them honestly:

A 1500-byte underlay leaves 1500 − (20+8+8+14+30) ≈ 1420 bytes for the inner payload that the macvlan-attached container can use. I chose 1380 as the bridge/VXLAN MTU to leave headroom and avoid path-MTU surprises.

If you do not set MTU on both br-office and vxlan-aws, TCP traffic over the L2 bridge will hang under load when packets fragment and the IPSec path drops the fragments.

Docker Multi-Network Trap

Two networks were needed:

• A default bridge for outbound traffic and Internet access (image pulls, ACME, NTP, etc).
• The office-lan macvlan with parent=br-office, so the container gets a 10.255.255.x address on the bridged L2.

The natural Compose definition for that is:

services:
  unifi-access:
    image: unifi-access-docker-arm64:stable
    networks:
      default: {}
      office-lan:
        ipv4_address: 10.255.255.200
    ports:
      - "443:443/tcp"
      - "80:80/tcp"
      - "8080:8080/tcp"
      - "12442-12443:12442-12443/tcp"

networks:
  default: {}
  office-lan:
    external: true

This deploys. The container starts, gets both NICs, listens on the right ports inside the container. From docker ps:

NAMES          PORTS
unifi-access   80/tcp, 443/tcp, 8080/tcp, 12442-12443/tcp

That output is wrong. There is no 0.0.0.0:443->443/tcp. The ports are exposed but not published. On the host, ss -tlnp shows no docker-proxy listening anywhere.

This is the docker-compose-v2 multi-network port-publish bug. When a service has both a bridge and a macvlan network declared in the same Compose service, the ports: block silently drops to "expose only".

The workaround is a two-phase deploy: Compose declares only the bridge with ports, and the macvlan is attached post-up:

flowchart LR
    A[Compose file<br/>default bridge + ports] --> B[docker compose up -d]
    B --> C[Ports published<br/>through docker-proxy]
    C --> D[docker network connect<br/>--ip 10.255.255.200 office-lan]
    D --> E[Container has two NICs<br/>eth0 bridge + eth1 macvlan]

docker compose -f docker-compose.cloud.yml up -d
docker network connect --ip 10.255.255.200 office-lan unifi-access

After this:

NAMES          PORTS
unifi-access   0.0.0.0:443->443/tcp, 0.0.0.0:80->80/tcp, ...

$ docker exec unifi-access ip -brief addr
eth0@if31  UP  172.17.0.2/16
eth1@if15  UP  10.255.255.200/24

UniFi Core's nginx listens on 0.0.0.0:443 inside the container. It binds on both NICs. Cloudflare can reach the EIP through the bridge NIC via docker-proxy. The Hub Mini at 10.255.255.230 can reach the controller directly through the macvlan NIC because both are on the same L2 broadcast domain.

Then I Broke It

The Cloudflare proxy returned 521 ("origin unreachable") a little later. The web path through the EIP had stopped working.

flowchart TB
    subgraph Internet
        CF[Cloudflare<br/>proxying access.example.com]
    end
    subgraph EC2["EC2 host network"]
        ens5[ens5<br/>172.31.26.37<br/>EIP-mapped]
        iptables[iptables PREROUTING<br/>DNAT tcp/443 → 172.17.0.2:443]
        docker0[docker0<br/>172.17.0.1]
        broffice[br-office<br/>10.255.255.50]
    end
    subgraph Container["unifi-access container"]
        eth0[eth0<br/>172.17.0.2]
        eth1[eth1<br/>10.255.255.200]
        nginx[nginx :443<br/>0.0.0.0]
    end
    subgraph Office
        LAN[Office host<br/>e.g. Synology]
    end

    CF -- "TLS to EIP" --> ens5
    ens5 --> iptables
    iptables --> docker0
    docker0 --> eth0
    eth0 --> nginx

    LAN -- "via VXLAN-over-IPSec" --> broffice
    broffice -- "expected path" --> eth1
    broffice -. "iptables PREROUTING wins:<br/>also DNATs to docker0!" .-> iptables

    style iptables fill:#f66

The cause was docker-proxy itself. When -p 443:443 publishes a port, docker installs an iptables DNAT rule that matches destination port without constraining the destination IP. The rule looks roughly like:

DNAT  tcp  *  *  0.0.0.0/0  0.0.0.0/0  tcp dpt:443  to:172.17.0.2:443

That matches traffic destined for the EIP and also matches traffic destined for the macvlan IP 10.255.255.200. From the office, a request to https://10.255.255.200 arrives on br-office, gets DNATed to 172.17.0.2:443, and the kernel forwards it to the docker bridge instead of delivering it to the macvlan NIC that the LAN client expected.

The two access paths conflict. The docker-proxy DNAT wins because PREROUTING runs before the bridge forwarding decision.

The fix had two parts:

Remove docker-proxy port publishing entirely. No -p flags, no ports: in compose. The container is reachable only through its macvlan IP on the office LAN.

Front the web tier through the existing Synology Traefik instead. The Synology lives on the same office LAN as the macvlan. From Traefik's perspective, the controller looks like any other LAN host; it just happens to be answered by something in AWS:

flowchart LR
    Browser --> CF[Cloudflare<br/>access.example.com]
    CF --> Synology[Synology Traefik<br/>10.255.255.245]
    Synology -. "via office LAN" .-> Container[unifi-access<br/>10.255.255.200<br/>via macvlan/VXLAN]

The Security Group on the EC2 also got much smaller. Web access does not enter through the EIP anymore, so 80/443 from the Internet are not needed. Access ports do not need direct allowlists from the office subnet either, because that traffic now arrives encapsulated as VXLAN inside IPSec - the SG only sees the outer IPSec/UDP-4500 packets.

Final inbound rules:

Everything else is denied. The controller has no Internet-exposed application surface. Its public identity is mediated by Cloudflare and Synology Traefik, not by an Internet-facing socket on the controller itself.

The Discovery Handshake, Live

After the L2 bridge and macvlan attachment, tcpdump on vxlan0 from the EC2 side captured the full UniFi discovery dance:

22:30:58.954333 IP 10.255.255.200.35510 > 233.89.188.1.10001:
    UDP, length 4
22:30:58.954387 IP 10.255.255.200.35510 > 10.255.255.255.10001:
    UDP, length 4

22:30:58.965433 IP 10.255.255.230.10001 > 10.255.255.200.35510:
    UDP, length 241
22:30:58.976442 IP 10.255.255.229.10001 > 10.255.255.200.35510:
    UDP, length 212
22:30:58.977665 IP 10.255.255.229.44119 > 255.255.255.255.10001:
    UDP, length 212

The first two lines are the controller (10.255.255.200) sending its discovery probes to UniFi's multicast group 233.89.188.1:10001 and the LAN broadcast 255.255.255.255:10001. The next three are the Hub Mini at .230 and the G3 Reader at .229 responding directly with their identity payloads.

This is the protocol working as Ubiquiti designed it. Nothing about the controller's actual location in AWS is visible from this trace; the L2 extension makes the topology look local.

Sessions established cleanly after that:

$ docker exec unifi-access ss -tnp state established | grep 10.255
tcp 0  26400  10.255.255.200:12443  10.255.255.230:51802  unifi-access-ap
tcp 0  0      10.255.255.200:12812  10.255.255.230:51799  unifi-access-ap

The Hub Mini holds two TCP sessions to the controller: 12443 for the Access UI/API channel and 12812 for MQTT control commands. Real-time door operations flow over 12812.

sequenceDiagram
    participant Container as unifi-access<br/>10.255.255.200<br/>(macvlan eth1)
    participant Bridge as br-office bridge
    participant VXLAN as vxlan0 / IPSec
    participant Hub as Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230

    Note over Container,Hub: Controller side periodic discovery

    Container->>Bridge: UDP src=10.255.255.200:35510<br/>dst=233.89.188.1:10001 (multicast)
    Container->>Bridge: UDP src=10.255.255.200:35510<br/>dst=255.255.255.255:10001 (broadcast)
    Bridge->>VXLAN: encap, encrypt, send
    VXLAN->>Hub: arrives on office L2

    Note over Hub: Hub Mini recognizes UniFi probe

    Hub->>VXLAN: UDP src=10.255.255.230:10001<br/>dst=10.255.255.200:35510<br/>length 241 (identity payload)
    VXLAN->>Bridge: decap on AWS
    Bridge->>Container: delivered to eth1

    Note over Container,Hub: Three more replies follow (Hub Mini retries)<br/>then G3 Reader at .229 also responds

    Container->>Hub: TCP 12443 SYN (Access UI/API channel)
    Container->>Hub: MQTT 12812 SYN (control plane)
    Hub-->>Container: ✓ both sessions established

    rect rgb(230, 255, 230)
        Note over Container,Hub: Device adopted. Doors operate.
    end

Mikrotik Bridge Counters Lie

A late-night debugging detour cost a real hour:

/interface print stats where name=vxlan-aws
0 RS vxlan-aws   RX-BYTE=0   TX-BYTE=28894   TX-PACKET=410

The RX counter on vxlan-aws was zero. The TX counter was incrementing rapidly. By all visible evidence, traffic was leaving Mikrotik for AWS but nothing was coming back.

The bridge host table told a different story:

/interface bridge host print where on-interface=vxlan-aws
#  MAC-ADDRESS         BRIDGE  REMOTE-IP
0  22:0C:29:0C:2F:11   bridge  (local)
1  4A:51:CF:46:03:91   bridge  172.31.26.37
2  62:F0:60:4C:FB:10   bridge  172.31.26.37

The bridge had clearly learned the AWS-side MAC addresses, including the docker container's macvlan MAC, with REMOTE-IP correctly pointing at the EC2 private address. That can only happen from incoming VXLAN packets.

On RouterOS 7.19.1 in this setup, /interface print stats lied for the VXLAN interface. The bridge-level statistics were correct. Trust /interface bridge host and /interface bridge port print stats, not /interface print stats when troubleshooting VXLAN.

Why the Container Has Two NICs

The container ends up with two interfaces inside it, and both matter for different reasons:

The application binds on 0.0.0.0 so it answers on both. The L2 broadcast traffic only arrives on eth1. Outbound DNS, cert refreshes, ulp-go cloud chatter all leave through eth0's default route, get NATed by docker bridge to the host's ens5, and reach the Internet without crossing the IPSec tunnel.

That separation also means a Synology Traefik route, talking to the controller as 10.255.255.200, never touches AWS billing for egress. Everything in the office LAN ↔ controller direction stays on LAN-equivalent ports of the office bridge, which is just a VXLAN tunnel that happens to encrypt over the AWS NAT-T path.

flowchart LR
    subgraph Container["unifi-access container"]
        direction TB
        Apps[unifi-core + unifi-access<br/>bind 0.0.0.0]
        eth0[eth0<br/>172.17.0.2/16<br/>docker bridge]
        eth1[eth1<br/>10.255.255.200/24<br/>macvlan office-lan]
        Apps --> eth0
        Apps --> eth1
    end

    subgraph Internet["Outbound flows"]
        NAT[docker NAT<br/>default via 172.17.0.1]
        FW[fw-update.ubnt.com<br/>NTP, DNS]
    end

    subgraph Office["Office L2 via VXLAN/IPSec"]
        Hub[Door Hub Mini<br/>10.255.255.230]
        Reader[G3 Reader<br/>10.255.255.229]
        Synology[Synology Traefik<br/>10.255.255.245]
    end

    eth0 --> NAT --> FW
    eth1 --> Hub
    eth1 --> Reader
    Synology --> eth1

    linkStyle 2 stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 3
    linkStyle 3 stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 3
    linkStyle 4 stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 3

What I Would Validate Before Trusting It

Working in this layered topology means there are several places where a single configuration error gives the wrong-but-plausible answer. I would not trust the design until all of these pass on a clean restart:

IPSec underlay:

ip xfrm state | grep -A2 reqid
ipsec statusall | grep -E "ESTABLISHED|INSTALLED"

VXLAN encapsulation:

# On EC2: outer encrypted packets should be flowing both directions
tcpdump -ni ens5 "udp port 4500 or udp port 4789"

# Inside the tunnel: bridge-relevant frames
tcpdump -ni vxlan0 "udp port 10001 or arp"

Bridge state, both ends:

# AWS side
bridge fdb show dev vxlan0
ip neigh show dev br-office

# Mikrotik side
/interface bridge host print where on-interface=vxlan-aws

End-to-end L2 reachability:

# From AWS host
ping -I br-office 10.255.255.230   # the Hub Mini

# From Mikrotik
/ping address=10.255.255.200 src-address=10.255.255.1

UniFi-level adoption:

docker exec unifi-access ss -tnp state established | grep -E ":(12443|12812)"
docker exec unifi-access journalctl -u unifi-access --since "5 minutes ago" \
    | grep -iE "adopt|inform|84:78"

If any of these regress, the layer that broke is usually obvious from where the trace stops.

What This Design Commits You To

This design gives a cloud-hosted Access controller adoption parity with a local one, at the cost of explicit network plumbing.

The useful properties:

• The G3 Door Hub Mini adopts and operates exactly as it would on a Ubiquiti console - no fork of its firmware, no SSH, no manual set-inform.
• The controller container is unreachable from the Internet directly. The only public surface is what Cloudflare and Synology Traefik expose.
• Door operations continue for already-synced credentials if AWS becomes unavailable. The controller is needed for new changes and sync, not for every local unlock decision.
• The architecture is reproducible. The VXLAN/bridge/macvlan bits are vanilla Linux primitives; the Mikrotik bits are stock RouterOS.

The explicit constraints:

• MTU has to be set consistently at three layers (bridge, vxlan, container interface). Forget one and TCP flows hang under load.
• The IPSec tunnel is on the critical path. Lose IPSec, the VXLAN encapsulation has nowhere to go, all adoption traffic stops within DPD timeout.
• Multi-network Compose with macvlan plus ports: silently breaks port publishing. The two-phase compose up + docker network connect pattern works around it but the failure mode is invisible until you check docker ps.
• Docker's port-publish DNAT competes with macvlan direct access. You can have one or the other; combining them through the same iptables PREROUTING chain leaves at least one path broken.
• In my RouterOS 7.19.1 run, VXLAN interface counters lied. Use bridge-level stats.
• The Synology kernel does not let you run binfmt_misc-registered foreign-arch binaries, regardless of privileges. arm64 workloads need a real arm64 host.

For a homelab access control system that should not depend on Ubiquiti consoles or on bringing the controller indoors, this is the simplest design I could find that respects the actual protocol constraints instead of fighting them.

References

• dciancu/unifi-protect-unvr-docker-arm64 - the foundation pattern this work extends
• UniFi Access on UniFi Consoles - support article
• Getting Started with UniFi Access - ports and communication model
• DHCP Option 43 for UniFi Access devices - r/UNIFI thread
• Linux VXLAN man page
• RouterOS 7 VXLAN documentation
• Docker macvlan driver
• strongSwan NAT traversal
• VXLAN: RFC 7348